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 In today’s globalised world interaction between the European Union law and ‘good old’ 
international law is unavoidable. This issue is beyond any doubt important to Bulgaria, being since 
January 1
st
 2007 a Member State of the European Union. Not accidentally the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) defines that ‘unlike any ordinary international treaties, the Treaty establishing the 
European Community creates its own legal system’1. This article examines the scope and content of 
the interrelation between EU law and public international law. It also discusses to what extent the 
counter-terrorism measures involve the attention of different international organizations and different 
jurisdictions. Making no claim to be exhaustive, this article aims to review the spheres where the 
European and international law intersect. 
  
The European Union and international agreements 
 Just like any other international organization the European Union has the powers to enter into 
international agreements with third parties or other international organizations. The most general 
regulations include the UN Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations of 1986
2
 as well as the provisions 
of the Community Law. Of fundamental importance among the latter is the wording of Article 218 of 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (ex Article 300 TEC) stipulating the procedure of 
concluding an international agreement: 
 3. The Commission, or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy where the agreement envisaged relates exclusively or principally to the common foreign and 
security policy, shall submit recommendations to the Council, which shall adopt a decision 
authorising the opening of negotiations and, depending on the subject of the agreement envisaged, 
nominating the Union negotiator or the head of the Union's negotiating team. 
 …… 
 6. The Council, on a proposal by the negotiator, shall adopt a decision concluding the 
agreement.Except where agreements relate exclusively to the common foreign and security policy, the 
Councilshall adopt the decision concluding the agreement: 
 (a) after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament in the following cases: 
 (i) association agreements; 
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 (ii) agreement on Union accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; 
 (iii) agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organising cooperation 
procedures; 
 (iv) agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union; 
 (v) agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or 
the special legislative procedure where consent by the European Parliament is required. 
 The European Parliament and the Council may, in an urgent situation, agree upon a time-
limit for consent. 
 (b) after consulting the European Parliament in other cases. The European Parliament shall 
deliver its opinion within a time-limit which the Council may set depending on the urgency of the 
matter. In the absence of an opinion within that time-limit, the Council may act. 
 …… 
 11. A Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission may obtain the 
opinion of the Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties. 
Where the opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not enter into force unless it 
is amended or the Treaties are revised. 
 Negotiations on conclusion of an international agreement are usually conducted by the 
Commission. The Council decides to open negotiations by a qualified majority except for agreements 
on association and in fields where decisions to be made within the framework of the Community 
require unanimity. Where the Council gives a mandate for negotiations, it may also issue guidelines to 
the Commission about how to conduct the negotiations. 
 Upon conclusion of the negotiations the Council is to adopt a decision on signature of the 
international agreement. The signing itself is to be effected either by the Council or the Commission, 
or jointly by the Commission and the Council’s Presidency. Pursuant to Article 218 of Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (ex Article 300 TEC) the European Parliament should be 
consulted prior to the conclusion of an international agreement with the exception of agreements 
related to the European Community Common trade policy. 
 Under the hypothesis of the so-called mixed agreements concerning fields of shared 
competences (where both the Union and Member States have competence) international agreements 
with third parties are concluded by both the European Community and the Member States. Usually 
negotiations are held in close cooperation with the Member States. Under the said hypothesis it is 
possible for Member States to authorise the Commission to conduct negotiations on their behalf.  
 In some cases in fields of shared competence it is only Member States that are formally a party 
to an international agreement but the Court nevertheless treats it as a ‘mixed agreement’3. Where the 
Community cannot be involved in a certain agreement because of its specific nature - such is the case 
of the International Labour Organization conventions of which the Community is not a member - it 
participates through the mediation of Member States and in that case too close cooperation is needed 
between the Community and the Member States. O'Keeffe and Schermers (1983) found that mixed 
agreements are known for their legal and political complexity, they may dilute the international 
identity and role of the Community and its institutions but at the same time they are an important 
characteristic of the Community’s external relations. In cases where the European Community has no 
exclusive competences the ECJ Member States may act collectively in signing international 
agreements or joining a convention.  
 The European Court of Justice may be approached to interfere prior to the conclusion of an 
agreement in order to assess its compatibility with the Founding Treaties of the European Union. In 
this case allowing the conclusion of such an international agreement would be tantamount indirectly to 
altering the primary law by way of an agreement with third parties. With a view to avoiding such a 
situation Article 218, paragraph 11 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
entitles the Council, the Commission or a Member State and subsequently the European Parliament to 
make an inquiry to the ECJ about the compatibility of an agreement that the Community intends to 
enter into with the Founding Treaties. In case of an adverse opinion of the Court the said international 
agreement may not take effect unless the conflict with the primary law is eliminated or amendments 
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are introduced to the Founding Treaties. That procedure of a priori control is ‘preferable to the option 
of declaring the decision on making the said agreement null and void after the signature of an 
international agreement (Article 263 TFEU, ex Article 230 TEC) which in any event would lead to 
difficulties in the relations with third parties’ (Jacque 2007, p.389). 
 It should be borne in mind that approaching the Court pursuant to Article 218 TFEU is about 
an international draft agreement. Therefore the ECJ may be approached as of the moment when the 
possible content of an international agreement is specified to a sufficient extent to warrant an opinion. 
No a priori control can be exercised after an agreement has been signed (see Opinion 3/94). In that 
case the only possibility would be proceedings to reverse the decision on conclusion of the 
international agreement. That understanding has been disputed in the doctrine on the ground that when 
an a priori opinion is requested, the procedure of concluding the agreement should be suspended until 
the ECJ pronounces its judgement. In Opinion 3/94, the Court stated ‘In any event, the State or the 
Community institution requesting an a priori opinion has also the right to request that a decision of the 
Council on conclusion of the international agreement be declared null and void’. 
 Any contestation a posteriori is in keeping with the provision of Article 263 TFEU (ex Article 
230 TEC) reading that it is possible to request that an act of the European institutions be declared null 
and void. 
 The Court of Justice of the European Union shall review the legality of legislative acts, of acts 
of the Council, of the Commission and of the European Central Bank, other than recommendations 
and opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament and of the European Council intended to 
produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. It shall also review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or 
agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. 
 It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the European 
Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an 
essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their 
application, or misuse of powers. 
 In a case known as ERTA
4
 the issue of international agreements was brought up. In its decision 
of 31 March, 1970, the Court treated a decision of the Council relating to the negotiation process on 
and signature by Member States of an agreement on road transport within the framework of the United 
Nations. The ECJ was to pronounce itself on whether it was admissible to contest the act. The Court 
ruled that the subject of the said agreement, i.e. the subject matter of road transport, was within the 
Community competence and the Council might not act in any way other than as an institution of the 
European Community. The ECJ found the action admissible as it was not the international agreement 
that was contested but the decision of the institution on conclusion of the agreement. The action was 
found admissible although by contesting the decision of the Council control was in fact exercised over 
the agreement itself. An extremely bold ruling of the Court bearing on international law too because if 
the ECJ had found that the act was contrary to law that would have led to its revocation and the said 
international agreement was signed and might have taken effect and bound the Community vis-a-vis 
third parties. Nevertheless the ECJ did not hesitate to reaffirm its jurisdiction in such cases. 
 In the ERTA case the ECJ deduced the implied external competence theory by ruling that 
beside its exclusive powers the Community, in addition to its internal competences, has also external 
competences in the respective field insofar that is instrumental to the objectives of the Founding 
Treaties. This is the so-called ‘parallel approach’ which means that to any external competence of the 
Community corresponds a common internal policy. Since the Community may regulate relations 
between the Member States in a given field, it should also be able to regulate relations between 
Member States and third parties. Where the Community acts in implementation of a common policy in 
accordance with the Treaties, the competency of Member States to undertake external acts in the 
context of that particular policy is precluded. 
 Originally the Court accepted that in order to exercise its implied external competence the 
Community should have already exercised its internal competence. With its decision on the Kramer 
case
5
 related to biological marine resources, the ECJ departed from its own requirement. Although as 
of that moment no internal measures were undertaken by the Community in the respective field, 
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external competence might be exercised without any internal measures in effect if in the opinion of the 
Court that was resorted to with a view to attaining the objectives of the Founding Treaties or the 
Community objectives were jeopardized by an external action of a Member State
6
. Until the 
Community exercises its competence Member States retain their temporary competence to initiate acts 
and conclude agreements with third parties insofar they do not put the realization of the Community 
objectives in jeopardy. 
 In its original practice the ECJ gave a latitudinarian interpretation of the Community powers 
including its external powers. Since the adoption of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) the Court 
has tried to take a neutral stand and has become extremely cautious with regard to distribution of 
powers between the national and the European level but at the same time it has abided by the 
conception of implied external competence established in the previous judicial practice. That is 
evident in Opinion 1/94 with the Court pronouncing itself on the possibility for the European 
Community to join the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Although 
it has been criticised for not completely upholding the exclusive Community competences the Court 
has kept in full the purport of its previous practice and has not infringed the external powers doctrine. 
 In November 2002 the ECJ pronounced itself on the so-called ‘Open skies’ cases7 where the 
European Commission questioned bilateral air transport agreements concluded by Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden with the United States and prosecuted a claim against 
those states. The Commission’s argument was that as a number of measures had been adopted on a 
Community level in the sphere of air transport since 1988, the Commission, being a Community 
institution, should be given a mandate to negotiate new agreements with third parties. The 
Commission saw the legal ground for that in Article 113 (new Article 207 TFEU) of the EEC Treaty 
as air transport agreements fell within the scope of the common trade policy. The ECJ claimed that the 
said bilateral agreements infringed some aspects of the primary and the secondary law and that in three 
fields of air transport the Community had exclusive powers while in the remaining fields - shared 
competence with the Member States. The Court followed the implied external competence logic of the 
ERTA case. Such implied external competence is at hand not only where the internal competence has 
been exercised in the process of development of the common policies but where internal Community 
measures are needed only for conclusion of an international agreement. Obligations of the Community 
vis-a-vis third parties may arise from provisions of the Founding Treaties related to the Community 
competence if the participation of the Community in an international agreement is required for 
attaining the Community objectives. Although the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
membership is reserved for states, by analogy with GATT and the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
the EU Member States retain their membership in those organizations but it is the European 
Community that plays a decisive role. A later decision of the ECJ deemed that the Member States 
might not enter into international agreements outside the framework of the Community institutions 
even where there was no conflict between those agreements and the Community norms
8
. 
 The latest wording concerning the EU right to conclude international agreements is in the 
Lisbon Treaty - Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU): 
 The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international 
agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to 
enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common 
rules or alter their scope. 
 Relatively recently the ECJ pronounced itself on an agreement between the EU and the United 
States regarding the provision of personal data of air passengers (PNR). The term PNR (Passenger 
Name Record) covers data related to names and destinations of passengers; details of plane ticket 
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purchase; the agency through which the ticket is purchased; the person/company making the 
reservation. Originally the International Air Transport Association (IATA) defined the limits and 
contents of those data and they were provided for air travel only. Subsequently the PNR data came to 
be used for hotel booking, rent-a-car and other activities. Since the events of 11 September, 2001 the 
PNR data have included the full names of travellers (until then the practice was to use surnames and 
initials of the first name, passport details (nationality, passport number and date of expiry) as well as 
the date and place of birth. The expansion of the PNR data scope causes concern with a number of 
nongovernmental organizations in respect of personal privacy as the data may contain home and 
business address, telephone numbers, credit card details, disability records - i.e. data of a medical or 
financial nature which, according to European standards, should be subject to protection to a certain 
extent. In the United States the collection, transfer and protection of data is responsibility of a special 
structure – US Customs and Border Protection under the newly established Department of Homeland 
Security. In 2004 the US administration took up negotiations with the European Commission on an 
agreement on transfer of PNR data (US-EU PNR Agreement)
9
. 
 The European Commission believes that the level of protection of PNR data transfer will meet 
the requirements of the Directive 95/46 EEC
10
 as the data will be collected and used solely with a view 
to preventing and countering terrorism and related crimes, other grave crimes including organized 
crime, which are transnational in their substance, etc. Under that agreement European air companies 
should within 15 minutes after take-off of the aircraft provide the PNR data to the competent US 
authorities; in case of failure to comply with their obligations they shall pay a fine of US 5 000 for the 
information on each traveller. The European Parliament initiated legal proceedings against the ECJ in 
the belief that the decision
11
 was adopted by the Commission ultra vires and violated fundamental 
principles laid down in the Directive 95/46 EEC such as personal privacy and personal data protection. 
By a decision rendered on 30 May, 2006
12
 the ECJ declared illegal the decision of the Council
13
 on 
conclusion of an agreement between the EU and the United States on transfer of PNR data as well as 
the decision of the European Commission on adequate protection of transferred data
14
. The Court's 
decision began with a reference to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights bearing on 
private and family life
15
. The ECJ deemed that the agreement in question should be concluded not on 
the basis of the common transport policy of the Union (pertaining to the Community pillar); the 
transfer of PNR data should be effected in view of activities pertaining to the Second and Third Pillars, 
i.e. public security, defence and criminal law cooperation; therefore the Directive 95/46 EEC was 
unenforceable as Article 3, paragraph 2 explicitly ruled out its application with regard to the Second 
and Third Pillar and limited the data transfer to the Community pillar. In the opinion of the ECJ the 
EU-US Agreement was not based on the correct legal ground which in turn posed the question of 
prompt dismantling of the Union's Pillar Architecture expected to take place upon the entry of the 
Lisbon Treaty in force. 
 The European Council resumed the negotiations before the deadline set by the Court, 30 
September, 2006 and in July, 2007 the United States and the European Union signed a new agreement 
on PRN data with the EU agreeing to provide data in nineteen categories to the US authorities. In 
February, 2008 Jonathan Faull, at that time Director General of the Justice and Home Affairs 
Directorate General and also former EU Commissioner Franco Frattini voiced their concern over the 
signature of bilateral memorandums of understanding by some of the new EU Member States (the 
Czech Republic, Latvia and Estonia) with the United States in exchange of abolishment of the visa 
regime. The Memorandums of understanding envisage additional, harder requirements of the US side 
with regard to providing data (biometrical data, details of stolen or lost passports) and ensuring so-
called sheriffs on board of trans-oceanic flights. Before that Jonathan Faull qualified the new 
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requirements of the US side as unacceptable and going too far. The compromise version proposed by 
Slovenia with a view to shaping a common European position was not adopted. 
 All the above said shows the close connection between international law and European law in 
terms of the characteristics of the EU competences as a supranational organization to enter into 
international agreements with third parties. 
  
The EU institute of citizenship and national identity 
 The institute of citizenship is of great importance both to each national legislation and 
international law. As per the well established practice nationality is exclusively governed by the 
domestic law of each State. It is the State itself that determines through the mechanisms of its 
legislation the procedure and way of acquisition, loss, reinstatement and content of nationality. As 
early as in 1930 The Hague hosted an international conference ending with the signature of a 
convention recognizing the right of each State to regulate itself its nationality. 
 It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be 
recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international 
customs and the principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality
16
. 
 Citizenship is a field of law where international law has a very limited effect reduced mostly 
to seeking a decrease of the number of stateless persons in the world, to granting them a status equal to 
that of aliens, to defining the status of refugees, etc. As it is known the Treaty on European Union has 
introduced the institute of European citizenship which does not replace but complements the national 
citizenship. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union 
stipulates the Treaty and further on citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty 
and shall be subject to the duties imposed hereby. The fundamental rights of European citizens include 
the right to move freely and reside in the territory of the European Union, the right to diplomatic and 
consular protection, the right of petitions and appeal to the European ombudsman, active and passive 
right of suffrage in local elections and elections for the European Parliament etc. 
 Lately, with reference to citizenship, the ECJ rendered a very interesting decision on 12 
September, 2006 on the case Spain v. United Kingdom known also as the “Gibraltar case”. The 
background of that case was connected with another case
17
, tried in 1998 by the European Court of 
Human Rights by virtue of which the United Kingdom received a sentence for not taking any action to 
ensure that people of Gibraltar who are British citizens take part in the elections for European 
Parliament. The European Court of Human Rights found the United Kingdom responsible for the 
discrepancy between the act on election of representatives to the European Parliament by direct 
universal suffrage and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 In compliance with a decision of the European Court of Human Rights the United Kingdom 
passed regulations under which citizens of the Union residing in Gibraltar were entitled to take part in 
elections for the European Parliament but spread out that right to citizens of the Commonwealth states 
residing in Gibraltar. Thus, the right to vote in elections for the European Parliament was conferred on 
persons who were not European citizens
18
. Spain disputed the right of persons who were not citizens 
of a Member State (neither of the United Kingdom nor any other Members State) and consequently of 
the European Union too to vote in elections for the European Parliament. The United Kingdom 
explained the adopted regulations by its specific constitutional traditions and special relations existing 
between the UK and the Commonwealth States. The European Commission supported the arguments 
of the UK referring to the EU’s obligation to respect the Member States' national identity. The ECJ 
dismissed Spain’s arguments and ruled that the United Kingdom, due to its traditions and 
constitutional set-up, was entitled to let persons who were not citizens of the European Union take part 
in the elections for the European Parliament. 
 What is interesting in this case though is that pronouncing itself in another case
19
 the Court 
denied the claim of two Dutch citizens, residents in the Aruba Island, who insisted that their names be 
included in the electoral register so that they could vote in the elections for the European Parliament. 
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However their claim was dismissed because the Dutch electoral law guaranteed participation in 
parliamentary elections and elections for the European Parliament to Dutch citizens who were 
residents in the European territory of the country only. Thus the Court’s different approach to the two 
cases was solely based on the EU obligation to respect the Member States national identity which - 
according to the Court - concerned the UK only. By all means however the two cases open up a 
discussion on citizenship and a future uniform electoral procedure would greatly forestall similar 
situations. 
  
The Lechouritou case and public international law 
 Lately we have been witnessing increasing interaction between the EC/EU law and in-
ternational public law including the differentiation between the public and private nature of legal 
relations. An example to that effect would be one of the latest ECJ decisions in case C—292/0520. The 
instituted prejudicial proceedings concerned 676 civilians killed by the German armed forces on 13 
December, 1943 in Kalavrita Municipality (Greece). As early as 1995 Mrs. Lechouritou along with 
other successors of the victims asked Greek courts to sentence the German state to pay indemnity for 
property and non-property damages inflicted on them by the German armed forces. The Greek courts 
dismissed the claim on the ground that they were not competent to pronounce themselves in so far that 
the defendant Federal Republic of Germany, being a sovereign state, had immunity. Before Efeteio Pa-
tron (Appelate Court, city of Patras), the plaintiffs referred to the Brussels Convention with regard to 
the competence and implementation of court decisions in civil and commercial cases. They pointed to 
a provision which in their opinion derogated the immunity granted to States in all cases of tort 
committed in the territory of the State of the approached court. The Appellate Court of Patras referred 
the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Communities: was the claim for indemnity for 
damages inflicted by the said acts within the sphere of application of the above mentioned 
Convention? 
 In its decision of 15 February, 2007 the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
recalled that although the Brussels Convention applied to “civil and commercial cases” it did not 
provide a definition of the contents of that concept. As per the Court’s practice the concept of “civil 
and commercial cases” should be viewed as an autonomous concept (in the context of the internal law 
of States). On the one hand, it should be interpreted in terms of the objectives and system of that 
Convention but on the other hand - in terms of the basic principles ensuing from the totality of the 
national legal systems, Thus some claims and court decisions are excluded form the category of “civil 
cases” due to the nature of legal relations between the parties to the litigation or because of the subject 
of that litigation. 
 Further on the Court noted that although some litigations between public bodies and private 
legal subjects may fall within the scope of application of the Brussels Convention, that did not apply to 
actions or inaction of the State (respectively public bodies or representatives of the State) related to 
exercise of public power - acta jure imperii. Consequently where a claim is based on a demand arising 
form an act of the public power, the claim should be excluded from the scope of application of the 
Convention. Any operations carried out by the armed forces of a given state are among the character-
istic manifestations of state sovereignty, particularly in view of the circumstance that the decision to 
carry them out is mandatory and is made unilaterally by the competent public authorities, and they are 
inseparably connected with the foreign policy and security of the State concerned
21
. Proceeding from 
the above argumentation the ECJ deemed that the legal action instituted by natural persons in a 
Contracting State versus another Contracting State which demands indemnity for damages suffered by 
successors of victims of acts committed by armed forces during military operations in the territory of 
the first State, did not fall in the scope of application of the Brussels Convention. 
 Obviously the ECJ decision was very disappointing to the plaintiffs in the case who, being 
successors of Greek civilians cruelly killed in mass numbers during the Second World War 
indisputably had the moral and political right to indemnity. As Gaertner (2007) justly pointed out in 
the concluding part of her review on the pages of German Law Journal, the Brussels Convention as an 
instrument to facilitate and assist the internal market by way of mutual recognition and 
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implementation of court decisions in civil and commercial cases, was hardly the right instrument in 
claiming indemnity for damages inflicted during an armed conflict. The categorical conclusion from 
the ECJ decision is that any consequences of acts caused during war or occupation may solely be 
judged in the light of international public law. 
  
The EU and counter-terrorism measures 
 The main problem raised recently is whether and to what extent any protection on a European 
level is possible with regard to EU acts adopted in implementation of counter-terrorism measures of 
the UN Security Council. Along that line is the analysis of the latest decisions of the Court of First 
Instance (CFI) and the ECJ. 
 The measures to combat terrorism adopted by the UN Security Council after the events of 11 
September, 2001 include preparation of lists of individuals or organizations connected with or 
assisting terrorist acts. Those measures are exclusively focused on freezing financial assets of such 
individuals with a view to diminishing the possibility of financing new terrorist acts but are often 
linked to travel restrictions and other prohibitions. Within the framework of the United Nations a 
Sanctions Committee was set up to monitor their application by Member States. It is the sole body that 
may take an individual or an organization off that list. 
 The European Union which is not a member of the United Nations applies the sanctions 
adopted by the UN Security Council by means of a two-tier procedure. First, the Union adopts a so-
called common position within the framework of the Intergovernmental Second Pillar - Common 
Foreign and Security Policy
22
 whereupon within the framework of the Community Pillar legally 
binding acts - regulations
23
 are adopted which are directly applicable in the territory of ail Member 
States. The implementation of the regulations is supervised by the European Commission which, in 
particular, updates the lists in keeping with the changes
24
 introduced by the Sanctions Committee. 
Thus the United Nations sanctions become part of the Community law having supremacy over 
national law. This however automatically brings up the question whether subjects on the UN Sanctions 
Committee’s lists may approach the European Court and seek protection (Lavranos 2007). That 
question is subject to discussion in theory but it acquired a practical dimension in the decisions 
rendered by the Court of First Instance in the Kadi, Yusuf, Ayadi and Hassan cases
25
. The first two 
cases attacked Regulation 881/2002 adopted in implementation of Resolution 1267 of the UN Security 
Council of 1999 which provides for measures vi-a-vis the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as well as 
Security Council Resolution 1390 of 2002 which expands both the scope of measures (freezing of 
bank accounts, travel restrictions and arms embargo) and their application to Al-Kaida or other 
individuals, groups, enterprises and structures connected with it, Annex I to Regulation 881/2002 
reproduces the UN Sanctions Committee’s list of individuals subject to measures including freezing of 
bank accounts. The plaintiffs before the CFI were residents in Ireland, Sweden, United Kingdom and 
Saudi Arabia who considered that their right to ownership, protection and fair trial was infringed. 
 Practically in its almost identical decisions in the Yusuf and Kadi cases of 21 September, 2005 
the CFI deemed that it was not competent to indirectly pronounce itself about the legality of sanctions 
adopted in the framework of the United Nations
26
. If it rendered a decision regarding Regulation 
881/2002 that would mean that the CFI would indirectly commit itself to reviewing the Security 
Council resolutions. The CFI examined only the inter-relation between the Security Council 
resolutions and the Community law and ruled that the resolutions prevail including vis-a-vis human 
                                                 
22
 Usually pursuant to Article 11, Article 15 and Article 29 of the TEU. See e.g. Common position 
2005/440/CFSP of 13 June, 2005 concerning restrictive measures against DR Congo. 
 
23
 See e.g. Council Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005. The Community acts were adopted pursuant to the 
provisions of Article 60, Article 301 and Article 308 of the EEC Treaty which caused justifiable objections in the 
theory. 
 
24
 See e.g. Commission Regulation (EC) No 84/2006. 
25
 Case T-306/01, Yusuf, [2005] ECR, II-3533; Case T-315/01, Kadi [2005] ECR, II-3649; and Case T-253/02 
Ayadi v. Council, judgment of the CFI of 12 July 2006; Case T-49/04 Hassan v. Council. 
 
26
 Yusuf, Case T-306/01 [2005] ECR, II-3533, par. 339 
rights. Referring to the provisions of Article 25, Article 48, paragraphs 2 and Article 103 of the United 
Nations Charter, the CFI deemed that obligations arising from the Charter prevail over any other 
obligation arising from an international agreement including that ensuing from the Community law to 
respect human rights. Only in case of infringement of jus cogens the CFI would be prone to pronounce 
itself on a Resolution of the United Nations Security Council but in that particular case the CFI 
deemed that there was no such infringement. The concept of jus cogens was defined by the CFI as “a 
body of higher rules of international public law from which there could be no derogation and they are 
binding on all subjects including United Nations structures”27. The self-limitation imposed by the CFI 
with regard to examining the validity of the Community acts adopted in implementation of resolutions 
of the Security Council is seriously criticized because of the fact that it does not support the 
Community standard of protection of human rights. Obviously the CFI cannot examine common 
positions as it has no jurisdiction with regard to the Second Pillar but with regard to the Community 
acts the Court could pronounce itself. In the opinion of a number of authors the CFI ought to appraise 
those acts in the light of the standards of the Community and the European Court of Human Rights 
and not in the light of jus cogens which is a much broader concept and undoubtedly covers the human 
rights problems but is still debatable in international judicial practice and doctrine (Bulterman 2006). 
Generally, the very idea of a regional court pronouncing itself on the legality of resolutions of the 
Security Council in the light of jus cogens has become a subject of a wide academic discussion. 
 Besides the CFI stated that the European Union was legally bound by the UN Security Council 
resolutions in the same way as the Member States and that caused serious objections in the theory 
(Lavranos
 
2007). The Court deemed that the Member States were obligated to cooperate with the UN 
Sanctions Committee. If effective legal protection on an international or European level (to attack the 
lists} was lacking, there was always a possibility for the Member States to ask that a certain 
individual/s be taken off the Sanctions Committee lists. Thus the individuals concerned may approach 
national courts and seek protection through the internal mechanisms in the respective Member State
28
. 
 Unquestionably the EU Member States are required to implement the measures provided for in 
the United Nations framework but is the EU required to do that to the same extent? If we try to leave 
aside political argumentation and the importance of the efforts to combat terrorism, the legal analysis 
will in fact lead us to Article 25, Article 48, paragraph 2 and Article 103 of the United Nations Charter 
as well as to Article 30, paragraph 6 of the Vienna Convention 1986
29
. Article 25 of the UN Charter 
stipulates that Member States shall accept and implement the Security Council decisions in 
compliance with the Charter. As per Article 48, par. 2 of the UN Charter the decisions for 
safeguarding international peace and security shall be carried out by the Members of the Organization 
directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members. 
Article 103 of the UN Charter stipulates prevalence of the obligations of Members of the Organization 
under the Charter over their obligations under any other international agreement (such as e.g. the EU 
Founding Treaties and the Statute of the Council of Europe) which is also reaffirmed in Article 30, 
paragraph 6 of the Vienna Convention 1986. However whether that prevalence under the UN Charter 
applies also to the EU law is a rather sensitive matter. As it is known the Community law constitutes 
an independent legal system other than that of international law and has its own internal hierarchy of 
norms with primary law having a leading position. According to some authors the next to come are 
international agreements and resolutions of international organizations which have become an integral 
part of the Community legal order. Consequently even if we accept that the United Nations measures 
have become part of the Community legal order, they will hardly enjoy any prevalence over the 
EC/EU Treaties (Lavranos
 
2007). In this sense the conclusion reached by the CFI to the effect that the 
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Union is bound to implement the sanctions provided for in SC Resolutions to the same extent as the 
Member States, sets off a discussion on the interrelation of national, European and international law. 
Some researchers believe that with its decision the CFI rejected the arguments of the plaintiffs that 
Community legal order is autonomous in relation to the international legal order (Lehnardt 2007)
. 
 The interrelation between primary law and international agreements concluded by Member 
States is regulated by both international law and Article 351 TFEU (ex Article 307 TEC). International 
agreements made after the entry of the EEC Treaty into force (January 1 1958) may not prevail over 
the Community law. By the way it is hard to imagine how e.g. Member States would enter in 
international agreements in spheres where they no longer have any competence. That fact is 
highlighted by the ECJ in its Opinion 1/75. “To accept such a competence would amount to 
recognizing that, in relations with third countries, Member States may adopt positions which differ 
from those which the Community intends to adopt and would thereby distort the institutional 
framework, call into question the mutual trust within the Community and prevent the latter from 
fulfilling its task in the defence of the common interest”30. By all means any conflict between the 
Founding Treaties and subsequent international agreement should be of a temporary nature only. 
Article 351 TFEU (ex Article 307 TEC) obligates Member States to use any possible means to 
terminate such a situation. They may denounce, modify or refuse to renew the said agreement, i.e. the 
problem shall be solved by methods which are customary under international law. 
  Article 351 TFEU (ex Article 307 TEC) allows Member States to continue to fulfil their 
obligations under agreements concluded before the Founding Treaties have taken effect but that, 
according to Professor Jean-Paul Jacquet, does not mean that those international agreements become 
part of the Community law (Jacque
 
2007). The ECJ envisages an exception when all Member States 
are parties to the respective international agreement and wish to bind the Community by the 
commitments ensuing from that agreement as in the case of GATT which is already of historical 
significance only as the European Community is a member of the World Trade Organization, 
successor of GATT. In the Yusuf case the CFI referred to the GATT precedent too in order to 
substantiate the statement that the EU is bound by the obligations ensuing from the UN Charter. 
 However it should be borne in mind that the CFI was not approached to take the respective 
individuals off the lists but to ascertain that the absence of an effective system of revising the lists in 
the Member States is not up to the standards of protection of human rights guaranteed by the 
Community law and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 A year later in its decisions in the Ayadi u Hassan cases of 12 July, 2006 the CFI, although not 
finding any infringement of human rights in that specific case, ruled that the Member States were 
obligated to respect the fundamental human rights of the individuals concerned and, insofar as is 
possible, to ensure that those individuals present their point of view to the competent national 
authorities. 
 The actual turn in the CFI approach occurred with its decision in the OMRI case (Organisation 
des Modjanedines du people d'lran)
31
 of 12 December, 2006. Unlike the limited approach to the 
measures related to Resolution 1267 the CFI declared null and void a decision adopted on the basis of 
Regulation 2580/2001 which on its part was in implementation of Resolution 1373 of the Security 
Council of 2001. The said Resolution bound States to freeze financial assets and undertake further 
measures with a view to preventing terrorist acts but unlike the regime provided for in Resolution 
1267 it left the identification of individuals (with the exception of those falling in the scope of 
Resolution 1267) and the freezing procedure within the States’ prerogatives. Thus Regulation 
2580/2001 enabled the Council to compile itself the lists of individuals to whom measures shall be 
applicable “on the basis of precise information and a decision made by a competent authority”32. It 
should be borne in mind that the European Parliament took the opportunity to voice its position against 
the manner in which the lists’ content was determined. 
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 Article 2, paragraph 3 of Regulation 2580/2001 
 A few months before the CFI judgements in the Yusuf and Kadi cases the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg pronounced itself on acts of Ireland's Government in connection with the 
United Nations sanctions against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia introduced into the Community 
legal order. In the Bosphorous case
33
 a Turkish air company leased an aircraft from the State Yugoslav 
Airlines. The aircraft was apprehended by the Irish authorities in compliance with the sanctions 
imposed by the United Nations encompassing any services related to air transport. The Turkish air 
company contested the apprehension before an Irish court and at the last instance the Supreme Court 
of Ireland addressed a prejudicial inquiry to the ECJ about the legality of the acts of the Irish 
authorities. The ECJ ruled that in the exercise of fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed 
by the Community law as the right of ownership and the right to engage in economic activities, one 
should take into consideration essential limitations of those rights imposed in connection with the UN 
sanctions. Thus the ECJ practically declined the Bosphorous claim in favour of the UN sanctions. 
Subsequently however Bosphorous instituted a lawsuit versus Ireland before the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg for violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. In June, 2005 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
concluded that the level of protection of fundamental human rights within the European Union was 
‘comparable although not identical’ (Birkhauser 2005) 34 with the protection under the European 
Convention on Human Rights due to which the Court in Strasbourg reaffirmed its competence to 
pronounce itself on Community acts in cases where the protection of fundamental human rights within 
the framework of the European Union was “evidently insufficient”35, i.e. in exceptional cases. 
 On 29 November, 2006 the UN Sanctions Committee modified its instructions obligating 
States to provide detailed information on specific motives for including individuals and organizations 
in the lists as well as a mechanism of reconsidering names which had been on the lists for at least four 
years. Since December, 2006 a possibility has been provided for the individuals concerned, 
irrespective of their governments, to file a complaint/petition for revision of the lists which does not 
entitle them however to participate in the proceedings, i.e. striking a name off the list is solely possible 
with the consent of representatives of all States sitting on the Sanctions Committee
36
. 
 In the meantime the plaintiffs in all four lawsuits, Kadi, Yusuf, Ayadi u Hassan, appealed 
against the CFI decisions before the ECJ. On 16 January, 2008 Advocate General M. Maduro’s 
conclusion in the Kadi case
37
 was published and it considerably differed from the CFI approach by 
favouring a higher level of protection of human rights guaranteed both within the framework of the 
European Union and by the European Convention on Human Rights (Raducu 2008). The question 
whether there is a possibility for protection against UN Security Council Resolutions and whether 
European courts are competent to judge acts of the Security Council is according to Advocate General 
Maduro extremely sensitive and is related to the place of obligations of the United Nations Member 
States within the framework of the Community legal order. 
 The Advocate General expressly emphasized that ‘the interrelations between international law 
and the Community legal order is determined by the Community legal order itself’38. At the same time 
Advocate General Maduro voiced his doubts as to whether the European Court of Human Rights 
would limit its jurisdiction with regard to implementation of the United Nations measures as such 
action would call in question the autonomous Community legal order and human rights protection. 
 On 3 September, 2008 the ECJ annulled the CFI judgement on blocking the assets of the Saudi 
businessman Yassin Abdullah Kadi and the Al Barakaat Foundation seated in Sweden
39
. As mentioned 
above both Kadi and the Al Barakaat organization are on the UN blacklist due to suspicions that they 
                                                 
33
 Bosphorous v. lreland, Decision of 30 June, 2005. 
34
 Bospfiorous v. Ireland, par. 155. 
35
 Bosphorous v. Ireland, par.156. 
36
 It should be borne in mind that the measures under Resolution 1267 include 143 individuals and 1 
organization suspected of having contacts with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as well as 179 individuals and 
114 organizations connected with Al Kaida. Only 5 persons have successfully gone through the procedure of 
being struck off the blacklist.  
 
37
 Advocate General's Opinion in Case C-402/05 
38
 Opinion, Case C-402/05, par 24. 
39
 Decision rendered by the ECJ in joint cases C-402/05 and C-415/05 on 3 September, 2008. 
have been financing Al Kaida. As per the Court's decision the Member States infringed the rights of 
the two plaintiffs by freezing their financial assets without notifying them of the grounds of that act. 
Besides, according to the ECJ, the right of legal defence was not guaranteed to Yassin Kadi and Al 
Barakaat. As pointed out by some researchers (Wessel 2008) that decision might seriously influence 
the traditional monist approach to international law as well as the entire international legal order. In 
paragraph 298 the ECJ stressed that the United Nations Charter did not impose any choice of a priori 
model of application of resolutions adopted by the Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of the 
Charter as those resolutions should be applied in accordance with the conditions and procedure 
provided for by the internal legislation of each UN Member State applicable to the respective case. In 
fact the United Nations Charter left in principle to UN Member States the freedom to choose among 
different possible models of implementing such resolutions in their internal legal order. The EU 
Member States have established their own ways of implementing the UN Security Council resolutions 
through the mechanisms of the European legislation. Thus the Court has shifted the emphasis from the 
discussion about the validity of international legal norms to acts by way of which the EC/EU 
implements the Security Council resolutions and which beyond any doubt are subject to supervision 
by the ECJ. Moreover, the Court of the European Communities will be obliged by all means to 
examine the EC/EU implementing acts referred to the Court in the light of the established Community 
legal order and standards of human rights and freedoms protection. 
 On the one hand, under the United Nations Charter, States are required to apply the measures 
provided for in the Security Council resolutions but on the other hand States are required by the 
Community law and the European Court of Human Rights practices to guarantee that blacklisting 
individuals or organizations may be appealed against before an independent instance - the CFI, ECJ or 
another justice administering body. Any future development is also largely connected with the Lisbon 
Treaty which recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles underlying the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and imparts a binding legal force to them (with the exception of the United Kingdom, Poland 
and Czech Republic). At the same time however, in the process of doing away with the Pillar 
Architecture of the Union the specifics of the jurisdiction of the ECJ (which is to be named Court of 
the European Union in relation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy) still exist. 
 The question in the case is not whether States are obligated to implement the measures 
adopted with the United Nations framework - autonomously or through the European Union - but how, 
fulfilling their obligations, they can ensure that human rights are protected in compliance with the 
EU/ECHR standards

. In that sense we could hardly speak of a conflict between the States’ 
obligations under international law and European law. 
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 Summary 
 In today’s globalised world interaction between the European Union law and ‘good old’ 
international law is unavoidable. This issue is beyond any doubt important to Bulgaria, being since 
January 1
st
 2007 a Member State of the European Union. Such areas of interrelation are the conclusion 
of international agreements by the EU, lately the EU-US PNR Agreement, data protection problems 
and some other issues connected with the European citizenship. In a number of recent judgements, the 
European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance have considered issues connected with the 
interaction between the EU law and the public international law. The main question is whether and to 
what extent any protection on a European level is possible with regard to EU acts adopted in the 
implementation of counter-terrorism measures of the UN Security Council. In its Kadi decision the 
CFI stated that the European Union was legally bound by the UN Security Council resolutions in the 
same way as the Member States and that caused serious objections in the theory. The conclusion 
reached by the CFI to the effect that the Union is bound to implement the sanctions provided for in SC 
Resolutions to the same extent as the Member States, sets off a discussion on the interrelation of 
national, European and international law. Some researchers believe that with its decision the CFI 
rejected the arguments of the plaintiffs that Community legal order is autonomous in relation to the 
international legal order. After the CFI decision the Advocate General Maduro made the statement that 
‘the interrelations between international law and the Community legal order is determined by the 
Community legal order itself’. On 3 September, 2008 the ECJ annulled the CFI judgement on 
blocking the assets of Mr. Kadi and the Al Barakaat Foundation seated in Sweden. The decision might 
seriously influence the traditional approach to international law as well as the entire international legal 
order. The ECJ conclusions considerably differed from the CFI approach by favouring a higher level 
of protection of human rights. 
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